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THE DIALECTIC OF FAITH AND REASON IN
THE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE
Ann Hartle

The question of Montaigne's sincerity in matters of faith has, in general,
been answered in two opposite ways. On the one hand, he is said to be an
atheist who hides his atheism behind infrequent and perfunctory assertions
of faith and submission to the Church. On the other hand, he is said to be a
sceptic-fideist who embraces scepticism at the philosophical level in order
to remove the intellectual obstacles to a faith that must remain inarticulate. I
attempt to show that the Essllljs display a dialectic of faith and reason, especially in the" Apology for Sebond u where Montaigne responds to two objections made to the project of natural theology. Commentators have described
Montaigne's defense of Sebond as, at best, ironic because Montaigne's
attack on reason in his reply to the second objection is, at the same time, an
attack on Sebond's own form of rationalism. I argue that Montaigne is actually defending a transformed version of Sebond's fundamental assumption
of the harmony of faith and reason, i.e., the harmony of examined faith and
reformed reason.

There are few questions about the Essays that have given rise to such radically different interpretations as the question concerning Montaigne's sincerity in matters of faith. 1 On one side, there is the claim that Montaigne is
really an atheist. This means that the passages where he does speak about
the Christian faith must be explained away as merely rhetorical: the rhetorical dimension of the Essays would be intended both to couch his teaching
in a form that can be acceptable to his largely Christian audience and to
protect him from censorship and persecution by the Church. This view of
Montaigne entails the claim that he writes in the tradition of the "noble
lie," a tradition that he clearly knows since he mentions it several times in
the Essays. This view also finds support in the highly ambiguous character
of the "defense" of natural theology found in the "Apology."
At the other end of the spectrum, we have the interpretations of those
who claim that Montaigne is a sceptic-fideist. In his Le Scepticisme de
Montaigne, Frederic Brahami presents a compelling version of this interpretation. He shows clearly that Montaigne's is a new scepticism, that he
breaks with the ancient sceptics on the decisive issue of the sovereign good
and goes further than the ancient sceptics in his annihilation of the pretenses of human reason. Brahami argues that this new scepticism is made possible, or rather, necessary, by the introduction of the Christian concept of
God. 2 Montaigne, then, would be a sceptic on the natural, philosophical
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level, and a "fideist" at the theological level. That is, he would deny the
ability of reason to grasp or to ground the truths of faith, and he would
deny that faith is itself a mode of thought that can give a public account of
itself. "The fideist founds the faith on faith; he is, literally, one for whom
there are no reasons to believe."3
The view of Montaigne as sceptic-fideist, finds support in Montaigne's
praise of scepticism as the most useful of all the philosophical teachings
because it presents man as naked, empty and weak, "annihilating his judgment to make more room for faith" (V5506; F375).4 It attempts to come to
terms with Montaigne's assertion that the immortality of the soul cannot be
established by reason but can be known only through faith (VS554; F415).
And it accords with his defense of his practice of avoiding the theological
language of divine providence. Montaigne puts forward his thoughts as
simply human, not as celestial rules, as "matter of opinion, not matter of
faith" (V5323; F234).
The claim that Montaigne is really an atheist who hides his atheism is,
on one level, impossible to refute. If the atheism is really hidden, then no
interpretation can find it and bring it out into the open. If it is only partly hidden or thinly veiled, then some of the things that Montaigne says
must be deliberately false. But how do we tell which things are false?
Ultimately, the selection must be either arbitrary or determined by a priori criteria. Of course, this claim to a hidden meaning cannot be refuted
by appealing to Montaigne's avowals of his sincerity, since these
avowals themselves may be merely rhetorical. But one reason why
many readers of Montaigne are so reluctant to accept the claim that he
lies, even nobly, is that his lying would be a betrayal of the reader's
trust: what is offered to us in the Essays is not a mere verbal puzzle but
the man himself and a man of a certain character, a man for whom truth
is a moral imperative. s
The difficulty with the claim that Montaigne is a sceptic-fideist has to do
with the way in which the sceptic-fideist must deliberately keep himself
from thinking about the truths that are most important to him. I acknowledge that Montaigne rejects the mode of 5ebond's natural theology, what
Brahami calls Sebond's "rationalism." And I do recognize the need to
make sense of Montaigne's claim that his project is simply human and of
his apparently ambiguous defense of Sebond. But "rationalism" does not
exhaust the meaning of thought. The sceptic-fideist interpretation really
amounts to a frustration of the natural desire to think honestly about one's
life and to a condition of conflict within the self that is not at all evident in
the Essays. 50 Brahami says that faith cannot be formulated in terms of
knowing, or even of thought. Man is a "believing thing," rather than a
"thinking thing."6
Where, then, is Montaigne's faith? It must be nowhere (because he is
really an atheist) or somewhere outside the Essays (because faith is inarticulate and private) or somehow in the Essays. This third possibility, that
Montaigne's faith is somehow in the Essays, is the answer that I want to
show to be true. We can begin, then, with the" Apology for 5ebond,"
since this essay deals so explicitly with the issue of belief.
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The Dialectic of Faith and Reason
Raymond Sebond was a Spanish theologian of the fifteenth century whose
book, entitled Natural Theology or the Book of Creatures, was given to
Montaigne's father who then asked his son to translate it from Latin into
French. Montaigne did so and then wrote this" apology" as a response to
two criticisms commonly made of this and other such works in natural theology. Montaigne reports that someone told him that Sebond's book was
actually a kind of distillation of the teachings of Thomas Aquinas.'
In the Prologue to his Natural Theology, Sebond claims that God has
revealed himself clearly in two "books:" first, in the Bible, and second, in
Nature. Sebond holds that man can know the truth about God and himself
by reading these truths in the book of Nature. In that book, each creature is
like a letter and man himself is the main or capital letter. Montaigne
describes Sebond's natural theology in this way: "His purpose is bold and
courageous, for he w1dertakes by human and natural reasons to establish
and prove against the atheists all the articles of the Christian religion ..... "
(VS440;F320). Montaigne's own task in the" Apology" is to defend Sebond
against the two principal objections that are made to his work. By describing his task in that way, Montaigne is adopting the Scholastic terminology
and mode of presentation, although his adaptation is very loose. The
Scholastics, including Aquinas, wrote in a highly structured form called, in
general, "The Question." A question is posed, e.g., Does God exist?; objections to the writer's own position are stated first, then the writer presents
his own view in the Respo1ldeo, and finally he answers the objections each
in tum. The entire" Apology," then, in spite of its length and its appearance of disorder, actually has a very simple underlying structure: the statement of and response to the first objection and the statement of and
response to the second objection.
If we compare this to the Scholastic disputed question, we see that what
is missing is the "body" of the Question, the author's own view or, in
Scholastic terminology, the "Respondeo" ("I answer that...."). The highly
structured form of the Question is intended to require the author to state
the authoritative objections to his own position and then to allow him the
freedom to say what he himself thinks. Where, then, is Montaigne's
"Respondeo"? It seems to me that it must be found in what I would call a
kind of "dialectic" between the two objections and responses. In other
words, it would be illegitimate to identify Montaigne's own position with
either of the two objections or even simply with his responses to both
objections. No doubt the responses by themselves do reveal something of
his own stance, but they do not give us the complete picture any more than
Aquinas's replies to objections would allow us to completely reconstruct
his own fully articulated Respondeo. The replies are consistent with the
Respondeo and give some idea of what the Respondeo must be, but they are
incomplete and stated in a way that is determined by the objection. What I
will now attempt to do is to work out that dialectic.
The first objection to Sebond's theology is put forward in the name of
piety by those who think of themselves as believers. They say that
"Christians do themselves harm in trying to support their belief by human
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reasons, since it is conceived only by faith and by a particular inspiration of
divine grace" (VS440;F321). The second objection is put forward by unbelievers and atheists. Sebond's arguments, they say, are "weak and unfit to
prove what he proposes." And these tmbelievers attempt to show that they
can easily shatter them (VS448;F327).
The first objection identifies faith with belief that is held by particular
inspiration of divine grace. The second objection identifies understanding
with autonomous reason and, thus, with unbelief, since Sebond's arguments
cannot command universal assent. Most commentators have placed
Montaigne himself entirely on the side of one or the other of these objections.
The view that he is an atheist places him on the side of the second objection
to Sebond; the view that he is a fideist places him on the side of the first
objection. Montaigne, however, refutes both objections and he also finds
something true in each objection, so that any interpretation of the" Apology"
that places him simply on either side must, in my view, be inadequate.
The two objections, as formulated by Montaigne, are usually regarded
as the opposing and contradictory voices of belief and unbelief. Brahami,
for example, says that "the second objection is diametrically opposed to the
first" and that "these two radical positions, that of belief and that of unbelief undermine the synthesis of Sebond."8 But when these objections are
exposed more fully, they show themselves to be related to each other and
even dependent on each other at a deeper level. The first objection defines
faith in terms of its origin: faith is "belief that is conceived only by faith and
by a particular inspiration of divine grace." God inspires those whom it
pleases him to inspire: that is why they believe and others do not. There is
a direct communication by God to the mind of the believer. Faith, then, is
taken to be private, inarticulate, and incommunicable. The second objection is a reaction against the possibility of faith but it also accepts this
understanding of what faith is. Unbelief must see faith as a private experience, an experience that it ultimately regards as illusory because it is publicly indefensible. Unbelief reacts against the first objection's claim to private knowledge and particular inspiration by putting forward as its standard what it takes to be the most public expression of the activity of the
mind, autonomous reason.
Rationality prides itself in being both public and common. In the first
place, it is completely transparent and communicable: when the demonstrations of Euclidian geometry are displayed, for example, they can be
understood by any rational human being and they receive universal
assent. The truths of faith, of course, do not receive universal assent.
Secondly, rationality is universal, the defining characteristic of the human
species, whereas particular inspiration is not universal. Therefore, on this
view of reason, faith (understood as particular inspiration) cannot give a
public account of itself. It is defenseless before the court of reason.

The first and second objections, then, share the same understanding of the
meaning of faith. It is this shared understanding that gives rise to the
"dialectic" of the two objections, and it is this shared understanding that
Montaigne is most deeply concerned to refute.
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Further, the first and second objections also share the same understanding of the meaning of reason. The first objection takes faith to be belief, but
belief that each is justified in holding because it comes from God by a direct
and particular inspiration. The beliefs that are guaranteed by particular
inspiration are then elevated to the status of knowledge and certitude. The
second objection sets demonstration as the standard of knowledge and
whatever cannot meet this publicly accessible standard must count as mere
belief or private opinion. Its demand, then, is that faith be defined and justified within the terms of the philosophical categories of knowledge, certitude,
and doubt. The doubt to which the first objection is susceptible is due to the
fact that faith cannot command universal assent because it cannot be demonstrated or proven. The first objection is prey to doubt because it implicitly
concedes the definition of reason assumed by the second objection.
In other words, the second objection accepts the first objection's definition of faith, and the first objection accepts the second objection's definition
of reason. It is to these shared understandings of what faith and reason are
that Montaigne is really addressing himself. To the first objection he
responds that faith is not belief held by particular divine inspiration. To the
second objection he responds that reason is not autonomous and cannot
secure universal assent.
The dialectic between the two objections and responses begins to come
to light when we examine the three ways in which Montaigne responds to
the first objection. Against the claim that Christian faith is held by means of
particular inspiration of divine grace and that faith is therefore a private,
incommunicable experience, Montaigne pushes in the direction of the public and the common. "We are Christians," he says, "by the same title that
we are Perigordians or Germans" (VS445;F325). This takes the pious objector out of his own private certitude and confronts him with the fact that,
had he been born in a very different place or time, had he not been brought
up as a Christian, he would not believe as he does. Montaigne is also moving away from the claim of divine origin and toward the acknowledgment
of the human origins of faith: "Another region, other witnesses, similar
promises and threats, might imprint upon us in the same way a contrary
belief" (ibid). Little Moslem and Hindu babies do not grow up to find
themselves somehow directly inspired by God to believe the articles of
Christian faith. By moving in the direction of human origins, we come to
the point where Christian faith looks no different from any other religious
belief. If it is not of divine origin, how can it claim any superior status? It
begins to appear "that we receive our religion only in our own way and
with our own hands, and not otherwise than as other religions are
received. We happen to have been born in a country where it was in practice" (VS445;F324).
Besides moving in the direction of the common and public, Montaigne
is also moving in the direction of the natural and away from the supernatural. For Christian belief now appears no different from any other "natural" beliefs or customs. Just as customs vary from country to country or
from culture to culture, so too do religious belief and practice. The terrible
reproach to Christians, Montaigne says, is that we do not even believe in
God to the same degree that we believe in the ordinary and natural. "If we
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believed in him, 1 do not say by faith, but [even] with a simple belief ... if
we believed in him just as in any other story, if we knew him like one of
our comrades, we would love him above all other things ... "(VS444;F324).
Montaigne is here making a distinction between faith and "simple belief"
and this is precisely the distinction that the first objection fails to make:
faith is belief held by particular inspiration. 1£ confidence in its divine origin is shaken, what is left is ordinary belief, belief that is unexamined and
presumptuous. It is this that begs for reason to step in because faith no
longer has any definitive claim to truth. The first objection's view of faith is
one that undermines itself and easily turns to unbelief. This is why
Montaigne agrees with those who predict that the Reformation will degenerate into atheism and why he attributes the second objection to atheism.
Once "personal consent" becomes authoritative, all of the ancient beliefs
will be shaken off "as a tyrannical yoke" (VS439;F320).
The second way in which Montaigne responds to the first objection is by
pointing to the lack of conformity between Christian belief and conduct.
"All other signs are common to all religions: hope, trust, ... , ceremonies,
penitence, martyrs. The peculiar mark of our truth should be our virtue, as
it is also the most heavenly and difficult mark, and the worthiest product
of truth" (VS442;F322). Once again, Montaigne is calling the objectors into
the public realm, demanding evidence of the presence of faith. But the
actions of most Christians give no evidence of such faith: "so divine and
celestial a teaching as ours marks Christians only by their words ....
Compare our morals with a Muhammadan's or a pagan's; we always fall
short of them. Whereas, in view of the advantage of our religion, we
should shine with excellence at an extreme and incomparable distance, and
people ought to say: 'Are they so just, so charitable, so good? Then they are
Christians"'(VS442;F322). Instead, we have civil war, extreme cruelty,
vengeance and hatred. Montaigne says: "There is no hostility that excels
CiU'istian hostility" (VS444;F324).
The failure of Christian moral action is a sign of the inadequacy of the
first objection's understanding of what faith is. In some cases, the lack of
conformity between belief and conduct entails hypocrisy and a deliberate
attempt to deceive others. But in most cases, it is simply a matter of selfdeception: "Some make the world [think] that they believe what they do
not [really] believe. Others, in greater number, make themselves believe it,
being unable to penetrate what it means to believe" (VS442;F322).
The third way in which Montaigne responds to the first objection is by
appealing to the authority that the pious believer must acknowledge, the
first great commandment: "Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with all thy
heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind." God commands that we
10V{:~ him with our minds and it is this commandment that justifies the project of theology. The theologians interpret the commandment, as Sebond
does, along the lines of natural philosophy, seeking the truth about God in
the book of nature and appealing especially to st. Paul's claim that "the
invisible things of God appear by the creation of the world, when we consider his eternal wisdom and his divinity in his works" (VS446;F326). So,
then, Montaigne concludes his response to the first objection with an assertion of compatibility between faith and reason, a compatibility that the first
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objection denies.
Now if we consider the medieval definition of theology as "faith seeking
understanding" we see that faith is primary. In the words of St. Anselm's
prayer: "Grant me to understand you to be as I [already] believe you to
be."'! As the formula of medieval theology puts it, philosophy is the "handmaiden" of theology. Montaigne's formulation of Sebond's project (that
"he undertakes by human and natural reasons to ... prove against the
atheists all the articles of the Christian religion") suggests that Sebond may
actually be claiming something closer to the independence of reason from
the first principles of faith, thus tending toward the reversal of Anselm's
"unless I believe, I shall not understand" to "unless I can prove, I shall not
believe."
But whether or not Sebond's mode of theology is an extreme and
unorthodox rationalism (as some have described it), Montaigne's defense
of the mind's place in the life of faith leads him directly into the second
objection. It is here, I think, that we get a sense of the" Apology" not simply as a response to all those others "out there" who fall within the two categories of objectors, but rather as a dialectic within Montaigne himself. For
in the process of responding to the understanding of faith in the first objection, he suddenly finds himself speaking in the voice of unbelief. He says:
"I have already, without thinking about it, half involved myself in the second objection ... " (VS448;F327).
The way in which Montaigne falls into the second objection and the way
he characterizes reason from the very beginning of his response suggests
that once reason is invited in, it claims for itself an authority that ultimately
admits no other authority. There are three related aspects of reason's selfassertion that Montaigne emphasizes. Reason inevitably tends to see itself
as what is highest in nature, therefore as entitled to rule, and therefore as
autonomous. Those who put forward the second objection, he says, "will
not allow us to combat their reason except by [reason] itself" (VS449;F328).
Reason is their only "touchstone" and they will neither receive nor
approve anything except by way of reason (VS541;F405). The first aspect of
the arrogance of reason which Montaigne combats is the way in which it
immediately sets out a hierarchy within nature and places itself at the top.
Reason sees itself at the highest point in nature because it recognizes itself
as the divine ordering principle of nature, and then concludes that man's
reason is in harmony with this divine ordering principle. Montaigne asks:
"Is it possible to imagine anything so ridiculous as that this miserable and
puny creature, [man, the rational animal] who is not even master of himself, exposed to the attacks of all things, should call himself master and
emperor of the universe, the least part of which it is not in his power to
know, much less to command?" (VS450;F329) And he characterizes the second objectors as "these people, who think Sebond's reasons too weak, who
are ignorant of nothing, who govern the world, who know everything"
(VS538;F402).
Now it must be said that this presumption of reason is very similar to
the position taken by Sebond's natural theology: man is said to be in the
image of God by virtue of his reason. This, of course, is why Montaigne's
so-called "defense" of Sebond seems ambiguous or even ironic: an attack
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on reason is an attack on the second group of objectors but, at the same
time, it is an attack on Sebond's entire project of nahlral theology. In attacking the arrogance of reason, Montaigne is acknowledging what is true in
the first objection, namely, that Christians do themselves harm by seeking
to support their faith by reason, if reason is presumed to be the
autonomous reason of the second objection. So also, in demanding public
evidence of faith, he acknowledges what is true in the second objection,
namely, the indefensibility of claims to private inspiration.
How, then, does Montaigne respond to the second objection, expressed
as the presumption and autonomy of reason? He responds in two ways.
First, he brings reason down from its heights, from its presumed divinity
down to the level of the animals. The animal stories in the" Apology" are
intended to bring man, the self-styled rational animal, to a recognition of
his equality not with God but with the beasts. The thrust of Montaigne's
argument is to show that reason is not the divine element in the human
soul but so common, so pervasive in all of animal nature, that the unbelievers who pride themselves on their rationality should disdain this reason as
lowly and base, by their own measure.
Montaigne's mode of reasoning in the discussion of the animals is analogical. The animal stories occur at the beginning of Montaigne's reply to
the second objection. He introduces this section with this question: "What
sort of faculty of ours do we not recognize in the actions of animals?"
(VS454;F332). He then takes us through a long list of human capacities and
points to the presence of each in the animals, e.g., reasoning, deduction,
induction, calculation, cunning, contemplation, moral virtue, and vice. The
mode of reasoning consists in moving from effect to cause and is based
upon the principle "like causes produce like effects" or "from like effects
we must infer like causes." When the fox goes out on the frozen river,
brings his ear very near the ice to hear the water running beneath, then
draws back or advances according to whether he finds the ice too thin or
thick enough for his weight, why should we deny to him the faculty of reasoning, of ratiocination, and of drawing conclusions: "What makes a noise
moves; what moves is not frozen; what is not frozen is liquid; what is liquid gives way under weight" (VS460;F337). This process of reasoning goes
on in ourselves. Therefore by the principle "like causes produce like
effects" we must infer a similar faculty in the fox.
Analogical reasoning is the mode of reasoning that Aquinas identifies as
the way we are entitled to speak about God. Montaigne is showing that
analogy cuts both ways: if we are justified in beginning from ourselves and
inferring what God must be, then we must accept the appropriateness of
this way of reasoning in thinking about animals. We are not entitled to
engage in reasoning by analogy only when it flatters our pretensions to
divine likeness. This willingness to liken ourselves to God is due to our
presumption which Montaigne refers to as "our first and original malady"
(VS452;F330). With respect to natural theology's practice of analogical reasoning, Montaigne says that" our overweening arrogance would pass the
divinity through our sieve" (VS528;F393) and he refers to "this arrogance
of trying to discover God with our eyes" (VS528;F394). It is "vain," he says,
"to try to make guesses about God from our analogies and conjectures, to
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regulate him and the world by our capacity and our laws ... "(VSS12;F380).
The second way in which Montaigne responds to the objection of tmbelief and the assertion of reason's autonomy is to point out and display in
vivid detail what he calls the "unruliness" of reason, especially as it manifests itself in the wild diversity of human opinion. That diversity is especially acute and instructive in the case of philosophical opinion, for here we
supposedly see man at his best, in his "highest estate." Yet, all of the centuries of philosophical speculation have not produced a single opinion on
which there is tmiversal agreement. Montaigne says that "we shall never
heap enough insults on the tmruliness of our mind" (VS24;FlS). Even the
greatest thinkers have only "amused themselves with reason as with a vain
and frivolous instrument, putting forward all sorts of notions and fancies"
(VSS4S;F408). Philosophy herself recognizes the lillfuliness of reason: "I am
calling reason our reveries and dreams, with the dispensation of philosophy, which says that even the crazy man and the wicked man are mad
with reason, but it is a particular sort of reason" (VSS23;F389). Finally, then,
we must conclude that reason, to which we had turned for a common
ground, the universal and defining characteristic of the species, is so highly particularized that it cannot serve as the common, public grotmd we
were seeking. Reason, Montaigne says, "always goes its way, even though
crooked, lame, and broken-hipped and with falsehood as with truth ... I
always call reason that semblance of intellect that each man fabricates in
himself. That reason, of which, by its condition, there can be a hundred
contradictory ones about one and the same subject, is an instrument of lead
and wax, stretchable, pliable, and adaptable to all biases and measures ... "
(VSS6S;F425).
The inability of reason to secure universal assent is especially clear in
Montaigne's criticisms of the theological view that there are "natural laws"
which are or can be known by all men through reason. "Men," he says,
"have done with nature as perfumers do with oil: they have sophisticated
her with so many arguments and farfetched reasonings that she has
become variable and particular for each man, and has lost her own constant and lmiversal countenance" (VSI049-S0;F803). There may be natural
laws that we can see in other creatures, "but in us they are lost; that fine
human reason butts in everywhere, domineering and commanding, muddling and confusing the face of things in accordance with its vanity and
inconsistency" (VSS81;F438). So, there is nothing so absurd that it has not
been said by some philosopher and nothing so bizarre or evil that it has not
been the custom or law of some nation. The logic of his response to the first
objection drove Montaigne to the common, public, universal ground of
reason. But autonomous reason, instead of being the rock on which to
build anything common, turns out to be a mere dream or, worse, a nightmare that dissolves into chaos. 10

The Harmony afFaith and Reason
Where, then, does Montaigne himself stand on the question of the relation
of faith and reason, at least insofar as that is revealed in the dialectic of the
two objections? We can begin to answer this by returning to the issue of his
sincerity in calling this essay a "defense" of Sebond. The tendency has been
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to see Montaigne's apology for Sebond as either completely ironic or as
unselfconsciously ambiguous and self-contradictory because, if he is either
an atheist or a sceptic-fideist, then he must deny any harmony or compatibility between faith and reason, and that compatibility is Sebond's most
fundamental assumption.
But it seems to me that, if we see the two objections in their relation to
each other and follow the movement of Montaigne's thought as he works
his way through the objections and their shared understandings of reason
and faith, we find that he is in fact defending a transformed version of
Sebond's assumption." Montaigne calls this essay an apology for Sebond
because he does affirm the harmony of faith and reason - but not faith as
defined in the first objection and not reason as assumed in the second
objection. For Montaigne, faith is not belief held by particular divine inspiration, and autonomous reason is not common and universal. The harmony that he recognizes and displays in the Essays is a harmony of true faith
and reformed reason.
What, then, is true faith and what is reformed reason? How are they in
harmony? Faith as defined in the first objection is incomplete, imperfect,
and even presumptuous: it is unexamined belief and it must be completed
and in some way transformed in its dialectic with reason. The autonomous
reason of the second objection is proud and presumptuous: it must be
reformed in its dialectic with faith. As we shall see, Montaigne's more
complete response to the two objections may be stated in this way: it is
faith, not autonomous reason, that is the ground of the common and universal. And that faith is not the opposite of thought but is itself a kind of
thought, thought that has been purged of presumption and unruliness.
In essay I.54, Montaigne discusses the "error" of those who "regard our
sticking to the old ways ... as simplicity and stupidity." Some of these people are brought through this error to "the extreme limit of Christian intelligence" where they come to understand the meaning of the Church.. A similar movement through error is mentioned in essay 1.27 and in this case it is
made explicit that the change is in Montaigne himself. The essay is entitled
"It is folly to measure the true and the false by our own capacity" and it
begins with a description of the presumption of the simple, ignorant, and
uneducated. Their presumption consists in believing too easily what they
are told, in being "led by the ears." But the educated are also susceptible to
presumption, indeed to a more insidious kind of presumption. Montaigne
says: "it is foolish presumption to go around disdaining and condemning
as false whatever does not seem likely to us; which is an ordinary vice in
those who think they have more than common ability." Then he adds: "I
used to do [that] once ... I felt compassion for the poor people who were
taken in by these follies. And now I think that I was at least as much to be
pitied myself" (VS17S-9;F132). Now Montaigne is subject neither to the
unthinking credulity of the simple nor to the arrogant presumption of the
learned.
In "Of the power of the imagination" he makes a similar distinction
between the simple and the learned. The simple think they see what they
do not see. Here he mentions certain popular superstitions such as ghosts
and visions. But the theologians and philosophers refuse to see what is
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before their very own eyes. Their doubt is such, he says, that "of ... actions
that happen in their presence they would refuse to give testimony ... and
they know no man so intimately that they would undertake to answer
fully for his intentions." He asks: how could these philosophers and theologians possibly stake their faith on a common faith? How could they
bring themselves to accept the testimony of simple people they don't even
know? (VS106;F76) Montaigne, on the other hand, does stake his faith on
the common faith and on the witnesses that God has chosen "from the
common people, simple and ignorant" (VSSOO;F369).
These passages reveal a mode and a movement of thought that is characteristic of the Essays, a movement of ascent and descent, from low to high
and back to low, from the lowly and ignorant to the lofty and learned and
then back to the lowly and ignorant. That movement of thought is just
what occurs in the dialectic of the two objections: from simple, inarticulate
belief he ascends through doubt to autonomous rationality and then
descends through doubt to the truth revealed in the testimony of simple
and ignorant witnesses. Of course, he cannot simply return to or deliberately adopt the stance of unthinking belief as if he had never ascended
from it. He ends up in a kind of middle position that transcends both simple credulity and learned presumption, and that, in philosophical terms,
would be called "learned ignorance." Perhaps this is what T.5. Eliot has in
mind when he says that "what makes Montaigne a very great figure is that
he succeeded . . . in giving expression to the scepticism of every human
being. For every man who thinks and lives by thought must have his own
scepticism, that which stops at the question, that which ends in denial, or
that which leads to faith and which is somehow integrated into the faith
which transcends it."12 Montaigne's scepticism is integrated into the faith
which transcends it. The faith that has transcended and transformed doubt
is not an unthinking and inarticulate faith but Montaigne's way of living
the examined life as a Christian.
For Montaigne, the common bond among men is not to be found in
autonomous reason but in "the Church" which he calls "that great common way" (VS520;F387). The universal is not to be found in reason but in
"the universal Church" (VS321;F232). The bond that unites all men, the
learned and the unlearned, is the Church. The truths of faith are common
to the lowliest village woman and the greatest theologian. What
Montaigne means by the Church is not simply the invisible Church or the
heavenly city of the reformers. Rome, he says, is "the only common and
universal city. . .. It is the metropolitan city of all Christian nations; the
Spaniard and the Frenchman, every man is at home there. To be one of the
princes of that state one need only be of Christendom, wherever it may be"
(VS997;F763).
In his reply to the first objection, Montaigne discusses the reasons why
some men are atheists. In a few cases, atheism is an opinion that they hold
seriously. But for many, it is "out of vanity and pride in conceiving opinions that are not common and that reform the world." When these people
are near death, when they have a sword thrust in the chest, when fear or
sickness beats down their fervor for distinction, they lift their hands to
heaven. Then, he says,"they will not fail to come back to themselves and
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very discreetly let themselves be formed by the common faith and examples." But there is another motive that he gives for returning to the common faith: "we are brought back to the belief in God either by force [the
sword thrust in the chest] or by love" (VS446;F325). Where is his example
of returning to the common faith through love? This, I believe, is
Montaigne himself. What it means to love God with all one's mind is to
engage in a mode of thought that finds its proper expression in the philosophical but non-authoritative form of the essay.
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